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Evaluation 
Introduction 
Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis 
1.  Observe offers made by opponent 
2.  Take best offer seen in time window 
3.  Perform Gaussian process regression (repeated at the 
end of each time window) 
•  Evaluated against ANAC 2010 negotiation agents, 
averaged over a variety of domains 
•  Tested with two risk 
profiles (s=1, s=4) 
•  Highest tournament 
score: 0.492  (s=1) 
•  Highest self-play 
score: 0.722 (s=1) 
•  Compare range of tournaments 
•  Find incentives for single agent to change strategy 
•  Search for equilibria 
•  Features of Complex Negotiation 
•  Alternating offers protocol 
•  Multiple negotiation issues 
•  Discrete and continuous issues 
•  Real-time constraints 
•  Discounting factor 
•  Deadline 
•  Unknown Opponents 
•  Unknown utility function 
•  Unknown behaviour 
•  Single negotiation encounter 
                                             
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Spiteful Behaviour 
•  Useful in competition 
environment: Automated 
Negotiating Agent 
Competition (ANAC). 
•  May wish to ‘win’ 
negotiation by reaching 
better agreements than 
opponents. 
•  Spiteful behaviour aims to 
avoid low utility agreements 
and therefore concedes less. 
Setting Concession Rate 
1.  Find best time, t* to reach agreement 
•  By maximising the expected discounted utility 
of opponent’s offers 
2.  Find best utility, u* to propose offers at 
•  By maximising the expected discounted utility 
of our offer at time t* 
3.  Concede towards this point [t*, u*] 
4.  Repeat until agreement or deadline is reached 
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Optimise Concession in Complex Negotiations against Unknown Opponents. Proceedings of the 22nd International 
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI Press. 
Each node represents a tournament of six agents using one of three 
strategies, from the discounted version of the largest domain used in 
ANAC 2010 (the travel domain). 
 
Each edge represents the best 
single-agent deviation from one 
mixture to another. 
 
Two equilibria (all agents use 
strategy IAMhaggler2011 
or all agents use strategy 
IAMhaggler2010). 
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